|
Title:
|
RANDOMREWARDMECHANISMS (LOOT BOXES): BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AS A REGULATORY SOLUTION IN BRAZILIAN LAW |
|
Author(s):
|
Laiane Maris Caetano Fantini |
|
ISBN:
|
978-989-8704-49-8 |
|
Editors:
|
Katherine Blashki, Yingcai Xiao, Piet Kommers and Pedro Isaías |
|
Year:
|
2023 |
|
Edition:
|
Single |
|
Keywords:
|
Loot Boxes, Regulation, Gambling, Behavioral Economics, Brazilian Law |
|
Type:
|
Full |
|
First Page:
|
187 |
|
Last Page:
|
194 |
|
Language:
|
English |
|
Cover:
|
|
|
Full Contents:
|
click to dowload 
|
|
Paper Abstract:
|
The paper seeks to reflect on ways to create an effective regulation by understanding the aspects of random reward mechanisms in video games, also known as loot boxes. Players acquire digital assets of a game through microtransactions, and pays with in-game currency or real money. Among these digital assets, several games also offer loot boxes, which are systems of "surprise boxes" with a certain price but whose reward is unknown to the player (and is only revealed when the box is purchased and opened). A simple way of selling a digital asset has serious implications for players, mainly due to the similarity with gambling in making the reward relegated to chance. Also, adults and children players are encouraged to exhibit addictive behaviors, spending time and money without any control. Brazilian law does not have enough apparatus to protect consumers from these practices and banning loot boxes from the market does not seem to be the solution, as similar mechanisms could arise even worse. This way of marketing digital assets hides the real transaction costs and makes consumers make decisions based on heuristics, and that's why the Behavioral Economic Theory can offer better solutions to protect players. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
