Title:
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AGENT NEGOTIATION STRATEGY IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE |
Author(s):
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Dorin Militaru |
ISBN:
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978-972-8924-60-7 |
Editors:
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António Palma dos Reis |
Year:
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2008 |
Edition:
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Single |
Keywords:
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Intelligent Agents, Electronic Commerce, Game Theory, Searching Rules
JEL Classification: C68, C72, D4, D83. |
Type:
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Short Paper |
First Page:
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161 |
Last Page:
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165 |
Language:
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English |
Cover:
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Full Contents:
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click to dowload
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Paper Abstract:
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The design of the negotiation strategy used by an agent to decide its negotiation behavior is a key problem in building
negotiating agents. In the electronic marketplace, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters including the
agents' reservation limits, the number of buying and selling agents, their attitude toward time. In this paper, we focus on
Internet searching agents which are tools allowing consumers to compare on-line Web-stores prices for a product. The
main purpose of the study is to investigate how costly information could affect the performance of several types of
searching agents in electronic commerce environments. The existing agents base their search on a predefined list of Webstores
and, as such, they can be qualified as fixed-sample size searching agents. However, with the implementation of
new Internet pricing schemes, this search rule may evolve toward more flexible search methods allowing for an explicit
trade-off between the communication costs and the product price. One possible alternative is the sequential optimal
search rule. Its adoption depends on its expected performance. The present paper analyses the relative performances of
two types of search agents on a virtual market with costly information. At the theoretical equilibrium of the market, we
show that the sequential rule-based searching agents with a reservation price always allow consumers to pay lower total
costs. |
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